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FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS AND
SECTION 1983
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, recodified 42
U.S.C. section 1983, is a statute with endless potential to rem-
edy deprivations of an individual's civil rights; yet for the
first fifty years of its existence, it appears to have been in-
voked no more than 21 times.1 Over the last fifteen years, how-
ever, persons have more and more frequently relied on this
statute to protect rights guaranteed by federal law. While the
specific purpose of section 1983 is not apparent from its broad
language,2 nor ascertainable despite the hundreds of pages of
recorded debate on the Civil Rights Act,3 it is clear that the
section was intended to open the federal courts to Negroes de-
nied equality.4 Placed in this setting, the section does seem to
qualify as remedial legislation which should result in liberal
constructions of remedies and narrow construction of defenses
under the Act.5 There are, however, countervailing considera-
tions based on conceptions of federalism which have developed
to somewhat inhibit the potentially sweeping application of
section 1983. This article will examine problems which pro-
spective plaintiffs must face when attempting to obtain relief
in federal courts; problems to a considerable degree based on
federal-state relations.
1. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of at Adequate Federal
Civil Remedy? 26 IND. L. J. 361, 362 (1951). See generally, Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcE. L. REv. 1323, 1336-43
(1952).
2. 42 U.S.C. §1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, reg-
ulations, custom or usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
3. See generally Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871).
4. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 376, 459, 514 (1871).
5. See Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal
Rights, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 839 (1964).
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I. THE RIGHTS PROTECTED BY SECTION 1983
Section 1983 was infrequently utilized in civil rights cases
for a great portion of its history, possibly because early judi-
cial treatment placed a very narrow interpretation on the
phrase "secured by the Constitution or laws." The idea pre-
vailed that to come within the scope of section 1983 a "right,
privilege or immunity" had to be one newly conferred, i.e.,
created by the Constitution or federal law.6 However, in the
1939 case of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,7
the Third Circuit determined that "secured" meant "pro-
tected,"8 which made section 1983 apply to deprivations of all
federal rights. This interpretation, coupled with increased
interest by the Justice Department in civil rights legisla-
tion, precipitated the renovation of attitudes toward sec-
tion 1983. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment has secured fed-
eral rights against state action and section 1983 reaches depri-
vations of such rights even when the deprivations are of an
individual nature.0
One possible limitation on the scope of section 1983 pro-
tection has been suggested in the equal protection area to
which section 1985(3)10 is made specifically applicable. The
argument is that section 1983 involves due process but not
equal protection because Congress specifically intended sec-
tion 1985 (3) to operate in the equal protection area.". This
argument, because of the fusion of equal protection into the
6. 26 IND. L. J., supra note 1, at 367.
7. 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939).
8. While the Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals on other grounds,
Chief Justice Stone, in a concurring opinion, specifically endorsed the Third
Circuit approach. 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939).
9. See Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Actions in the Wake of Monroe v.
Pape, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1486 (1969).
10. 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) reads:
If two or more persons ... conspire or go in disguise on the high-
way or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws ... the party so injured or deprived may have
an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
11. See Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 940 (1955) ; McShane v. Moldavan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 24
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due process clause seems questionable, 12 and has been rejected
for the most part in cases such as Valle v. Stengei' 3 and Moss
v. Hornig.1
4
Generally, courts faced with the unqualified language of
section 1983 should have no basis for denying relief based on
any federally created rights. (Note the possible exception be-
ing rights created under a federal statute which itself specifies
a means of redress.)1 5 Some of the areas where section 1983
has been utilized to protect individual rights are: (1) Vio-
lence and abuse in the administration of law, (2) Prisoners
rights, (3) Abuse of Judicial Process, (4) Freedom of Speech,
assembly and religion, (5) Right of franchise, and (6) Dis-
crimination because of race.'6
II. UNDER COLOR OF LAW
Section 1983 violations occur when individuals are de-
prived of rights secured by federal law by persons acting
"under color of law."' 7 Acting "under color of law" demands
state action of some variety I8 and the requirement is satisfied
whenever a state official deprives a person of a federal right,
whether he acts in accordance with state law or contrary to
it.' 9 In addition, it was determined in United States v. Price
2 0
12. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that due process
as expressed in the fifth amendment includes the concept of equal protection).
13. 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949).
14. 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963). Note, however, that when a denial of equal
protection is alleged, the plaintiff must make a showing of purposeful discrimi-
nation against a class. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). See generally 39
N.Y.U. L. REV., note 5 supra, at 840-43, for a discussion of this entire problem
and the arguments raised for retaining broad section 1983 protection.
15. See Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REv.,
1285, 1291-92 (1953).
16. See 2 EMERSON, HABER, AND DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIvIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1356-2253 (1967) for an extensive collection of cases deal-
ing with the different individual rights mentioned.
17. Note that section 1983, unlike its criminal counterpart 18 U.S.C. §242,
applies only to actions under color of state law. See Norton v. McShane, 332
F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965). Otherwise, how-
ever, the color of law requirements sections 242 and 1983 have been treated as
synonymous. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961). See generally 15 AM.
JUR. 2d Civil Rights §14 (1964).
18. See generally Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)
for a discussion of the meaning of this term.
19. Monroe v. Pape 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
20. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
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that private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in
prohibited action, are acting under "color of law for purposes
of the statute."
'2'
Without exploring in. any great detail the possible outer
limits of the "color of law" requirement,2 2 it seems that pri-
vate citizens acting under the authority of a state statute mak-
ing them police officers for special purposes, 23 or a person
acting in a specially state sanctioned occupation,24 will be held
to have satisfied the requirements for a section 1983 action.
The line, however, may fall on the other side of a private citi-
zen making a "citizen's arrest.1
25
A 1970 Supreme Court decision may have some broad
ramifications on the "color of law" requirement of Section
1983. The case, Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 26 arose out of
a refusal to serve a white New York school teacher seated with
six blacks in a Hattiesburg, Mississippi lunchroom. The school
teacher subsequently brought suit in New York under section
1983 seeking injunctive relief and attempted to satisfy the
state action requirement by alleging that "the customs of the
people" were "customs" within the meaning of Section 1983.
It was the plaintiff's position that the customs of the people
amounted to state action within the fourteenth amendment.
A second theory utilized was that the defendants had acted
under color of a Mississippi criminal trespass statute27 which
allowed people engaged in public businesses to refuse to serve
anyone in their unfettered discretion. It was argued that such
statute necessarily encouraged private discrimination and con-
sequently amounted to state action.
21. Note that this case dealt with 18 U.S.C. 242, but that its holding with
regard to the scope of the term "under color of law" is generally applicable to
section 1983. See note 17 supra, as well as Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970).
22. See LocKHART, KAMIZAR, AND CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES 1019-20 (3d ed. 1970) for an interesting set of questions on the prob-
lem of how far "color of law" should be extended.
23. See Flemming v. S. C. Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955),
appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956) (bus driver who under state law was a
"police officer")
24. See Williams v. U.S., 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (private detective who was
a "special police officer" under local law).
25. See Warren v. Cummings, 303 F. Supp. 803 (D. Colo. 1969).
26. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). See 84 HARv. L. REv. 71 (1970) for an excellent
casenote on Adickes.
27. Miss. CODE §2046.5 (1956).
[Vol. :24
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The Supreme Court, in a five-to-two opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan, held that the plaintiff could recover under Section
1983 by proving individual discrimination with knowledge of
and pursuant to a custom having the force of law by virtue of
persistent official practices. Aside from the encouragement
of the criminal trespass statute, the court suggested a custom
of segregation might have been "enforced" through inten-
tional police tolerance of violence or threats of violence against
sit-in demonstrators, or through direct police harassment in-
volving groundless arrests on any charges.
2 8
Dissenting Justices Brennan and Douglas felt that the
term "custom" in section 1983 included mere "customs of the
people." The majority did not accept this expansive approach
to the term but no real hint was given as to how far the term
"customs having the force of law" may be carried even if the
phrase does not include purely personal practices.
29
III. JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear actions
under section 1983 so long as there is deprivation of a right
protected by federal law or the Constitution, by anyone acting
under color of state law. There is no jurisdictional amount
necessary so long as the complaint states a cause of action for
deprivation of a civil right.30 Two problems that immediately
arise, however, when an action is brought in a federal district
court are exhaustion of state remedies and abstention.
A. Exhaustion of State Remedies.
Exhaustion of remedies as applied to section 1983 gen-
erally involves a federal court declining in its equitable juris-
diction to exercise properly invoked federal jurisdiction as a
matter of comity to prevent interference with matters norm-
ally handled by the states. The rule has been limited to cases
where the state remedy is administrative and implies wide
28. 398 U.S. at 172 (1956).
29. See United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) for an interpretation
of the relation of older civil rights legislation to the "exclusive" remedies of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 when dealing with private discrimination. See also
Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 398. U.S. 144 (1970).
30. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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rights of return to the federal court once state remedies have
been exhausted.
31
The doctrine of exhaustion has been excluded from section
1983 actions by a series of cases beginning with Monroe v.
Pape -3 2 which upheld a complaint alleging a grossly illegal
search by a Chicago policeman as sufficient to maintain a sec-
tion 1983 cause of action. The Court here said, "It is no an-
swer that the State has a law which if enforced would give re-
lief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refusdd before the
federal remedy is invoked. '3 3 (Note that here the court was
speaking with reference to a state judicial proceeding.)
Then in 1963 McNeese v. Board of Education3 4 was de-
cided. In this case a Negro objected to school segregation and
requested that a federal district court order integration ac-
cording to an approved plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a
dismissal of the complaint, citing the plaintiff's failure to ex-
haust remedies under the state education law. The Supreme
Court reversed for what seemed to be alternative reasons: (1)
the opinion suggests that the Civil Rights Act provided an al-
ternative remedy to those available under state law, and (2)
the available state administrative remedy was inadequate.
Finally, in Damico v. California,35 a 1967 welfare case,
the Court in a one paragraph opinion said:
[To require exhaustion] was error. In McNeese v. Board of Educa-
tion . . .noting that one of the purposes underlying the Civil Rights
Act was to 'provide a remedy in federal courts supplementary to any
remedy, any State might have' . . . we held that 'relief under the Civil
Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought
under state law which provided [an administrative] remedy.' . . . See
Monroe v. Pape .... 30
31. The doctrine developed because a particular self-restraint was felt neces-
sary in administrative proceedings to permit persons with special expertise to
render final determination on a specific matter. See 2 A.r. JuR. 2d Adm. Law
§595 (1962).
32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
33. Id. at 183.
34. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
35. 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
36. Id. at 417. Justice Harlan in dissent objected to decision "without bene-
fit of briefs and oral argument and on a skimpy record," and disagreed with the
majority's reading of MeNeese and Monroe. Id. at 418-420.
[Vol. 24
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NOTES
While Damico has been strongly criticized37 for its use of in-
sufficient authority to justify its off-handed treatment of the
exhaustion problem, it does represent the present law on the
matter.
38
A suggestion that the exhaustion rule might be revived
under proper circumstances, however, can be vaguely inferred
from the case of King v. Smith30 where Chief Justice Warren
stressed "the importance of the case" as a reason for not re-
quiring exhaustion.40 Certainly, there are cases which involve
only minor deprivations of an individual's civil rights,41 yet
without requiring exhaustion of state remedies, even these ac-
tions may be permitted to disrupt established state administra-
tive procedures. A possible method of limiting such conse-
quences of section 1983 actions is expounded in the HARVARD
LAw REVIEW 42 where it is suggested that the courts take a "de-
ferral approach" to jurisdiction.43 This approach involves the
federal courts accepting jurisdiction only when section 1983
would: (1) override certain kinds of state law, (2) provide a
remedy where state law is inadequate, (3) provide a remedy
where state recourse is adequate in theory but not in practice,
or (4) remedy class deprivation. (Note that the first three
areas are those which Mr. Justice Douglas articulated as the
"three main aims" of section 1983 in Monroe v. Pope.) Such
an approach would seem to permit effectuation of the purposes
behind section 1983, yet dampen the seemingly uncompromis-
37. 82 HARV. L. RFv., note 9 supra; Comment, Exhaustion of State Reme-
dies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLua. L. REv. 1201 (1968).
38. See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 416 (1968); Houghton v. Shafer,
392 U.S. 639 (1968). But see Metcalf v. Swank, 444 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1971).
39. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
40. See 82 HARY. L. REV., note 9 supra, at 1500-01.
41. For example, alleged improper action by a university official could be
termed a relatively minor deprivation if a clear procedure for appeal of the de-
cision is provided.
42. 82 HARY. L. REv., note 9 supra.
43. This article discusses the concept of a fully supplementary federal
i emedy, as well as propounds a "deferral approach" to limit access to the fed-
cral courts. See also Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction; A reply, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 1352 (1970).
1972]
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ing language of recent cases 44 which may lead to overburdened
federal dockets and needless friction with state interests.
B. ABSTENTION.
The counterpart to the exhaustion rule, when dealing with
state judicial activities, is the doctrine of abstention.45 The
basic elements of the doctrine are that: (1) a district court is
vested with discretion to decline to exercise or postpone the
exercise of its jurisdiction in deference to state court resolu-
lion of underlying issues of state law;4" (2) where resolution
of a federal constitutional question is dependent upon, or ma-
terially altered by, the determination of an uncertain issue of
state law, abstention may be proper in order to avoid unneces-
sary friction in federal-state relations, interference with im-
portant state functions, tentative decisions on questions of
state law, or premature constitutional adjudication ;47 and (3)
deference to state court adjudication will be made only where
the issue of state law is uncertain.
48
Since the doctrine of federal abstention was first pro-
pounded in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,49
44. See Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam), (welfare) ;
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), (school segregation). The
deferral approach would seem to allow federal relief in all these cases and
would only be irreconcilable with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (grossly
illegal search and detention by police officer).
45. See generally Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurters
Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REv. 604 (1967).
46. The doctrine has traditionally developed around notions of equitable
discretion, although in special situations has been invoked in cases not techni-
cally within this area. Id. at 605 n. 16.
47. Federal-question abstention should be distinguished from broader con-
cepts of abstention which involve federal restraint to prevent disruption of
"comprehensive regulatory systems." E.g., Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern R.R., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943). It is to be pointed out that in this section abstention will be treated
primarily as a general rule applied by federal courts to decline jurisdiction in
deference to state interest-operating very similarly to exhaustion of remedies.
See generally Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HA.M
L. REv. 1358 (1960), which discusses the problems underlying attempts to al-
low state courts to decide only specific state law questions.
48. Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965) cithig Railroad
Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and McNeese v. Bd. of
Education, 373 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1963).
49. 312 U.S. 396, 500 (1941). A unanimous court through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said:
8
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NOTES
a racial discrimination case, it is somewhat ironic that the
civil rights area is the one where a specific exception has been
carved out. The earliest case holding abstention improper
where "fundamental human liberties" are drawn in issue is
Stapleton v. Mitchell." The Court here stated that human
rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper sub-
ject for adjudication "and.. . we have not the right to decline
the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights as-
serted may be adjudicated in some other form."5 1
In the 1961 case of Monroe v. Pape,52 the Supreme Court
determined that section 1983 provided a supplemental remedy
in the federal courts for any deprivation of a constitutionally
protected right. Relying on this reasoning in the 1963 case of
McNeese v. Board of Education,5 3 it was stated that a require-
ment that assertion of a federal right "await an attempt to
vindicate the same claim in a state court" would defeat the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act. While this case dealt with the
question of exhaustion of state administrative remedies, be-
cause of the broad language used in condemning any delay in
adjudication of federal rights, it has also been taken to exclude
abstention from the area of civil rights cases.54
Dombrowski v. Pfister55 was decided in 1965, and the
Court specifically rejected abstention where a statute was
justifiably attacked as on its face abridging free expression,
or as applied for purposes of discouraging protected activities.
This case, because it dealt with the freedom of speech, cer-
tainly added support to the contention that a specific civil
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an
issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced to-
morrow by a state adjudication.... The resources of equity are
equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative
decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional ad-
judication.
50. 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kans. 1945), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 326
U.S. 690 (1945).
51. Id. at 55. The Stapelton rationale has been followed with few dissent-
ing voices by a number of lower federal courts. See Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323
F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963) ; 80 HARv. L. Rav., note 45 supra, at 608 n. 31.
52. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
53. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
54. See 80 HARV. L. Ray., note 45 supra, at 610. But see Askew v. Har-
grave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
55. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
1972]
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rights exception should be recognized to the abstention doc-
trine.50 A narrower interpretation of the case, however, in-
volves the assertion that the court was justified in refusing to
abstain because the statute was void on its face and issuing
an injunction against enforcement until such time as a valid
narrowing construction was placed on the statute compelled
the state to express itself in clear terms, thereby insuring pro-
spective violators fair warning of the scope of the prohibi-
tion.
5 7
The normal justifications for a broad "civil rights case"
exception to the abstention doctrine are that civil rights cases
are especially likely to enflame local passion creating substan-
tial possibilities of prejudice, and civil rights cases involve an
especially strong national interest in the federal forum. 58 So-
lutions are offered to a complete abrogation of the doctrine in
civil rights cases and include limiting the exception to absten-
tion in cases arising under the Civil Rights Act,59 limiting it
to cases of racial discrimination, 6 or limiting refusal to ab-
stain to cases involving personal, as opposed to property,
rights.
6 '
At the present time there is no clear answer as to the
status of abstention under section 1983. It does appear, how-
ever, that the recent case of Askew v. Hargrave62 rules out
adoption of any broad "civil rights case" exception to the ab-
stention doctrine. The case arose out of a challenge to a Florida
law known as the "Milledge Roll-back Law" 63 which required
that, to be eligible to receive state monies, the local school dis-
56. See also Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965) which held
that it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to abstain in a challenge to a
Virginia poll tax. Here the court seemed to adopt a "national interest" rationale
by finding support for refusal to abstain in "the nature of the constitutional
deprivation" (here voting rights). But see Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S.
167 (1959).
57. 80 HARv. L. REv., note 45 supra, at 612-13.
58. See generally 80 HARv. L. Ray., note 45 supra, at 605; 82 HARv. L.
REV., note 9 supra, at 1490-92.
59. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW AND CONTEaMP. PROB. 216, 230 (1948).
60. ALI Study, proposed 28 U.S.C. Section 1371 (f) (Tent. Draft, No. 4,
1966) at 112-13.
61. See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) ; HARV. L. REv., note 41
supra, at 611.
62. 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. §236.251 (Supp. 1970).
[Vol. 24
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trict, with certain exceptions, must limit ad valorem taxes to
not more than 10 mills. A class action was filed in the federal
court alleging invidious discrimination, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, against school children in poor coun-
ties. A three-judge court granted summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs declaring the law unconstitutional.6 4
The Supreme Court noted that while suit had also been
commenced attacking the law in the state court based primar-
ily on state constitutional grounds, the district court still re-
fused to abstain on the basis of the Monroe v. Pape and Mc-
Neese decisions. Commenting on this, it was said:
The reliance upon Monroe z. Pape and McNeese was misplaced.
Monroe v. Pape is not in point for there "the state remedy, though ade-
quate in theory, was not available in practice." 365 U.S., at 174....
McNeese held that "assertion of a federal claim in a federal court [need
not] await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court." 373
U.S., at 672 .... Our understanding from the colloquy on oral argu-
ment with counsel for the parties is that the [state] case asserts, not
the "same claim," that is, the federal claim of alleged denial of the fed-
eral right of equal protection, but primarily state law claims under the
Florida Constitution, which claims, if sustained, will obviate the neces-
sity of determining the Fourteenth Amendment question. 5
The Askew opinion cites the case of Reetz v. Bozanich"6
as a recent example of the line of decisions which should in-
form the district court as to whether or not to abstain. Until
Askew, the Reetz decision had been minimized because it re-
quired abstention in a case which dealt with property, rather
than personal, rights;67 although the case did re-emphasize
the fact that in limited situations, where state law was uncer-
tain and a state decision would alleviate the need for a deci-
sion on federal constitutional grounds, abstention was appro-
priate.
Even after Reetz and Askew, a qualification would appear
to be necessarily placed on any abstention involving civil
rights; and that is that a "plain, speedy and efficient state
64. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (1970).
65. 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971).
66. 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
67. Reid v. Board of Education, 40 U.S.L.W. 2410, 2411 (2d Cir. Dec. 14,
1971).
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court remedy be available." ' s A decision as-to whether a state
court remedy meets this qualification should not depend solely
on how rapidly a declaratory judgment or other review is ob-
tainable, but should also take into consideration the nature of
the rights involved, the potential injury, the degree of impor-
tance placed on the state interest with which the federal court
would be interfering, and other factors pertinent to the speci-
fic situation. Consequently, while the Askew decision does not
appear to undermine decisions such as Dombrowski and Har-
man v. Forssenius, 9 it may require federal courts, desiring to
here specific civil rights cases which potentially interfere with
legitimate state interests, to balance the various factors in-
volved in light of notions of comity, the purpose behind the
abstention doctrine, and the obligation to protect federally
guaranteed rights30 It may be difficult at times to determine
precisely where the balance is struck in the civil rights area,
but thorough, well-reasoned opinions should for the most part
produce results far more acceptable than either abstaining en-
tirely or not at all in an area so susceptible to federal-state
friction.
Reflecting on the doctrines of exhaustion of remedies and
abstention in anticipation of commencing section 1983 actions,
it does appear as though neither doctrine will substantially
impede this "supplemental" relief where important and pre-
ferred federally guaranteed rights are involved. In periferal
areas, however, where matters may be more satisfactorily re-
solved by the states because of the availability of an adequate
state remedy and an especially strong state interest, individ-
uals may find exhaustion and abstention far more formidable
68. See ALI Study, proposed 28 U.S.C. §1371 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1966). Such a requirement could mean that even a limited application of the
rule foreclosed when a federal court is faced with deprivations of "preferred
freedoms" within the first amendment because any delay in such area is intoler-
able. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489 (1965) ; Cameron v. John-
son, 381 U.S. 741 (1965). This rationale of "unwarranted delays" may place
many other fundamental civil rights outside even the narrowest notions of ab-
stention, relegating any application of the doctrine to more or less secondary
rights in strict factual settings which clearly require abstention to prevent clear
waste of a tentative decision. Cf. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965)
(voting rights). See Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconsti-
tutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L. J. 143, 153 (1968).
69. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
70. See Reid v. Board of Education, 40 U.S.L.W. 2410, 2411 (2d Cir. Dec.
14, 1971).
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as a deterrent to federal relief.71 In addition, even if one is
successful in presenting his complaints to a federal court
under section 1983, there are other difficulties such as im-
munity, the federal anti-injunction statute, and notions of fed-
eral equity jurisdiction, which may further complicate efforts
to obtain relief. A discussion of the potential problems that
may be encountered in these areas will be undertaken in the
next section.
IV. REMEDIES
Once it is established that there has been deprivation of
a federally protected right, that the deprivation was caused
by one acting under color of law, and that a federal court
should properly hear the case, the next question becomes one of
seeking a remedy. An initial decision usually involved in sec-
tion 1983 actions is whether to proceed in equity for an in-
junction, or at law for damages.7 2
A. Damages
The major problem with a damage action under section
1983 is the doctrine of state immunity for public officials.7 3
It is clear that state common law immunities do protect in-
dividuals even from federal damage suits.7 4 One must decide,
however, who is entitled to immunity and whether it is com-
plete or only qualified. In 1967, in Pierson 'v. Ray,7 5 the Su-
preme Court held the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity
applicable to actions under section 1983. Support for this
position was drawn from the 1951 case of Tenney v. Brand-
71. See Metcalf v. Swank, 444 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1971) (refusing to adopt
a complete abrogation of exhaustion in the civil rights area); 68 CoLmM. L.
REv., note 37 supra, at 1205; Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (reject-
ing any broad abstention exception in the civil rights area).
72. Note that there may be a statute of limitations problem. See generally
Note, A Limitation on Actions for Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68 CoLUM.
L. REv. 763 (1968).
73. See generally Comment, Federal Comity, Official Immnimty and the
Dilemma of Section 1983, 1967 Dur L. J. 741 (1967) for an extensive treat-
ment of this subject which includes discussions of possible defendants on a class
basis.
74. See 39 N.Y.U. L. REv., note 5 supra, at 851, which draws the inference
from the anti-injunction statute 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1965) that states should be
free from disruptive federal activities, even under section 1983.
75. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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hwve 70 which held state legislators immune under section 1983.
Pierson has been criticized, however, in that the congressional
intent of section 1983 and the policies underlying the excep-
tion are said not to support a grant of judicial immunity, but
rather argue for judicial liability under an actual malice stand-
ard.7
7
At the opposite end of the spectrum is immunity when
dealing with ministerial officials. In 1961, the Supreme Court,
in Monroe v. Pape,78 held that a police officer need not have a
specific intent to deprive an individual of his constitutional
rights to become liable under section 1983. Mr. Justice
Douglas concluded that "Section [1983] . . . should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man re-
sponsible for the natural consequences of his actions."7 9 Con-
sequently, a plaintiff suing a police officer under section 1983
need only state that he was deprived of federal rights "under
color of law" to state a cause of action.80 While Monroe does
away with the qualified privilege based on "the lack of a spe-
cific intent to deprive a person of a federal right" that has
sometimes mistakenly been read into section 1983,81 the im-
pact of the case must be appraised in light of the immunity
that still exists if a policeman acts in good faith with probable
cause.82
The question has also been raised as to whether an im-
munity exists if an official is properly carrying out an uncon-
stitutional activity dictated by a state statute or a judicial
order. Beginning with Myers v. Anderson,8 3 several election
cases have imposed liability on officials for refusing to regis-
ter Negroes under discriminatory state legislation. Note, how-
ever, that the problem becomes far more difficult when the
official is faced with questionable, as opposed to clearly
76. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
77. See Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE
L. J. 322 (1969) ; 39 N.Y.U. L. REv., note 5, supra, at 852-54.
78. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
79. Id. at 187.
80. See 1967 DUKE L. J., note 73, supra, at 801.
81. See Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962), overruling Hoffman
v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959).
82. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 557 (1967). See also 1967 DuKE L. J., note 73, supra, at 804 n. 290.
83. 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
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unconstitutional, legislation. 4 On the other hand, the courts
have uniformly found an immunity to be present if the official
is acting under a judicial order.85
Faced with the gamut of state common law immunities,
section 1983 has still been reasonably effective in providing
redress against law enforcement officials," local boards,
87
and councilsS s However, the problem often faced in suits for
damages, even if immunity is avoided, is a hostile jury. This
is one difficulty even the insulation of a federal court does not
overcome. To avoid both the immunity problem and the jury,
one may consider relief which can be sought in equity.89
B. Injunctions
"Federalism aims to promote, not only pluralism, the dis-
bursement of power among distinct units, but also democratic
participation in individual liberty."90 When individual liberty
and minority rights have been abused, direct intervention by
the federal government has usually been unnecessary. Federal
judicial review has normally been sufficient to protect basic
political values, but where local abuse is not satisfactorily
checked, "direct" intervention may be justifiably necessary.
Normally, federal courts should be reluctant to use injunctive
powers to interfere with the conduct of state officials, but
where there is a deprivation of a constitutionally guaranteed
right, the duty to use injunctive relief cannot be avoided.0 1
Consequently, after a trial on the merits, equitable relief is
available to protect civil rights under section 1983. This relief
84. See Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights
Acts, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1229, 1239-40 (1955). See generally 1967 DuKE L. J.,
note 73, sapra.
85. See 1967 DUKE L. J., note 73 supra, at 798.
86. See note 78 and accompanying text.
87. See 1967 DUKE L. J., note 73 mpra, at 791.
88. Id. at 773 n. 143 which discusses the "rule of reasonable discretion" as
applied to local boards and councils.
89. Note that if damages and injunctive relief are requested, the federal
courts preference for a jury trial may leave crucial factual determinations in the
hands of the jury. These findings are consequently binding on the court sitting
in equity. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) ; Beacon Thea-
tres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
90. Note, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L. J. 1007,
1029 (1966).
91. See e.g., Wood v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964).
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has the advantage, as opposed to damage actions under sec-
tion 1983, in that violators of an injunction will be subject to
a contempt proceeding which does not involve a jury.
One area especially sensitive to federal-state friction, how-
ever, involves state enforcement of its criminal laws, and an
individual seeking relief under section 1983 from either
threatened or pending criminal prosecutions may run into a
great deal of difficulty. Generally, courts of equity have been
restrained from interfering in state criminal prosecutions as
a result of the notion of "comity," which is an attempt to per-
mit state courts to decide state cases free from interference
from federal courts. 2 Comity, with regard to enjoining pend-
ing criminal proceedings, finds expression in 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2283 which forbids federal courts from enjoining state
proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress." As for threatened state prosecutions, the case of Ex
pcrte Young, and others, have established,
the doctrine that, when absolutely necessary for the protection of consti-
tutional rights, courts of the United States have power to enjoin state
officers from instituting criminal actions. But this may ordinarily not
be done, except under extraordinary circumstances, where the danger
of an irreparable loss is both great and immediate .... The accused
should first set up and rely on his defenses in state courts, even though
this involves a challenge to the validity of some statute, unless it plainly
appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.
93
The "irreparable" injury which must be shown to justify in-
junctive relief against threatened prosecutions must be some-
thing more than the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having
to defend against a single criminal prosecution, brought law-
fully and in good faith.
94
In 1965 the Supreme Court decided Dombrowski v.
Pfister,3 which was taken by many to hold that irreparable in-
juries sufficient to justify injunctive relief against threatened
prosecutions could be based upon two independent circum-
stances.9 6 The first of these involved statutes justifiably at-
tacked on their face for overbreadth and vagueness, which the
92. See generally 75 YALE L. J., note 90 supra.
93. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926).
94. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
95. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. See, e.g., Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon
for Social Change: Reflections from Without and Within, 18 KAxs. L. Rsv.
237, 252 (1970).
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court in Dombrowski appeared to conclude exerted a "chilling
effect" on the exercise of first amendment rights that alone
was sufficient to warrant federal intervention. An alternative
ground justifying injunctive relief involved a showing of bad
faith application of a statute in an attempt to discourage pro-
tected activities.
In an effort to resolve some of the confusion surrounding
Dombrowski, the Court handed down a series of decisions97 in
February, 1971, principally involving the cases of Younger v.
Harris,98 and Samuels v. Mackell.99 Younger v. Harris dealt
with an individual who obtained an injunction against a state
prosecution commenced against him under an act allegedly un-
constitutional on its face because of vagueness and over-
breadth. In its opinion, the Supreme Court first recognized
that the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. Section
2283, expressed the long-standing public policy against federal
court interference with state court proceedings. The question
of whether this statute specifically barred injunctive relief
was never reached, however, because the court subsequently
found that in order to grant injunctive relief from pending
criminal prosecutions, a showing of "extraordinary circum-
stances, where the danger of irreparable loss was both great
and immediate," would first have to be made. 0 0 Turning to
Dombrowski, the court recognized that while certain state-
ments in that opinion could be taken to indicate that the exist-
ence of a "chilling effect" from an overbroad or vague statute,
alone could justify the granting of equitable relief, such re-
97. In addition to the cases of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
Samuels v. MacKell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), and Perez v. Ledesvia, 401 U.S. 82
(1971), which are discussed infra, see Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Dyson v. Stern, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
See also Carey, Federal Court Intervention in State CriminaI Prosecutions, 56
MASS. L.Q. 11 (1971) for an article discussing all these decisions.
98. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
99. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
100. While the Court specifically stated that it was expressing no view on
situations where there was no prosecution pending in the state court and at-
tempted to deal in Younger with only a pending prosecution, since it relied in
part on Dombrowski which involved threatened prosecutions, it would seem tc
be permissible to conclude that general criteria applicable to both situations waE
actually being discussed. Of course, additional circumstances, beyond what
would otherwise be necessary to enjoin threatened action, could still be required
to entitle one to relief where a prosecution has actually begun.
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marks were unnecessary to the decision. Consequently, it was
stated:
We do not think that opinion [Dombrowskil] stands for the proposition
that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a statute solely
on the basis of a showing that the statute "on its face" abridges First
Amendment rights. There may, of course, be extraordinary circum-
stances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in
the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harrassment.i 0i
Failing to find any bad faith or other extraordinary circum-
stances in the case sufficient to justify intervention irrespec-
tive of whether a criminal prosecution was threatened or act-
ually commenced, the Court held that injunctive relief had
been improperly granted by the three-judge court.
Samuels v. Mackel o2 was a case involving three defen-
dants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in pending
state prosecutions. The Court in this case determined that:
A declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference
with and disruption of state proceedings that the long-standing policy
limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.'
03
The reasons for this conclusion were, first, that once a declara-
tory judgment is issued, a district court could grant injunctive
relief to protect or effectuate their decision. Secondly, it was
stated that even if the declaratory judgment were not used as
a basis for actually issuing an injunction, the declaratory re-
lief alone had virtually the same impact as a formal injunction.
Consequently, the Court held that unless some unusual circum-
stances were present, a district court should not issue declara-
tory judgments concerning proceedings already underway in
state courts.
The Court in Samuels was careful to state that it ex-
pressed no view on the propriety of declaratory relief when no
state proceeding had begun at the time the federal suit was
commenced, but Mr. Justice Brennan, in Perez v. Ledesma, 04
did undertake to express his views on this matter. In an exten-
sive concurring opinion, he pointed out the distinctions be-
tween declaratory and injunctive relief and concluded that
when no state proceeding is pending and a statute is chal-
lenged as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad,
101. 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
102. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
103. Id. at 72.
104. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
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,the federal court must decide which of the requested forms of relief
should be granted. Ordinarily a declaratory judgment will be appro-
priate if the case-or-controversy requirements of Article III are met,
if the narrow special factors, warranting federal abstention are absent,
and if the declaration will serve a useful purpose in resolving the dis-
pute.105
Aside from the question of whether declaratory relief may
yet be appropriate under threatened state prosecutions, the
question left unanswered by the court after the Younger v.
Harris and Samuels v. Mackeli decisions is whether section
1983 is an "express" exception to 28 U.S.C. section 2283. The
Fourth Circuit, representative of the majority of circuits, has
held that section 1983 does not constitute an express excep-
tion.10 6 The Third Circuit, however, in Cooper v. Hutchin-
son,107 has expressed the view that section 1983 does consti-
tute an express exception to section 2283.108
Even prior to Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court had
an opportunity to resolve this conflict when it faced Cameron
v. Johnson'0 9 in 1965. In this case the appellant specifically
raised the issue of whether section 1983 was an express excep-
tion to section 2283, but the Supreme Court avoided the issue
with a per curiam reversal requiring that the district court
reconsider the case "in light of the criteria set forth" in
Dombrowski."0 The case came back to the Court in 1968,"'
but this time the plaintiffs had failed to meet the "irreparable
injury" test which permitted the Court to state that:
We find it unnecessary to resolve either question [of whether Section
1983 is an express exception or whether Section 2283 prohibits an in-
junction against state action already commenced] and intimate no view
whatsoever on the correctness of the holding of the District Court." 2
A suggested method of avoiding section 2283 when in-
junctive relief is requested to stay pending state court actions
under section 1983 is to hold that the anti-injunction statute
105. Id. at 122-23. See also Wulp v. Corcoran, 40 U.S.L.W. 2494 (lst Cir.
January 11, 1972).
106. Barnes v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
107. 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
108. See also Machesky v. Bizzel, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); 4 GA. L.
REv. 610 (1970).
109. 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
110. Id. at 742.
111. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
112. Id. at 613, n. 3.
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merely expressed a principle of comity and is not a rule re-
stricting the power of the federal courts.11 3 This would per-
mit the court to issue injunctions, even against pending state
actions, upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances suf-
ficient to justify the interference. This method may possibly
be foreclosed, however, as a result of the case of Atlantic Coast
Line v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,"4 which con-
cluded that any injunction against state court proceedings
must be based on one of the specific statutory exemptions to
section 2283 and that these exceptions should not be enlarged
by loose statutory construction.
Irrespective of the language found in Atlantic Coast Line
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,"5 there does seem
to be sufficient justification for the court to find an implied
exception for specific section 1983 actions which involve "ex-
traordinary circumstances" that satisfy the requirements of
cases such as Younger v. Harris. The justification involves the
fact that it is totally inconsistent with the policies underlying
section 1983, that the courts should be powerless to act in clear
cases of bad faith, harassment, or multiple prosecution under
unconstitutional statutes."0
The case of Sheridan v. Garrison 117 illustrates a situation
in which injunctive relief may properly be used in order to
stay a pending state criminal prosecution. The case arose out
of an hour-long documentary television show highly critical of
New Orleans district attorney Jim Garrison's probe into the
Kennedy assassination, after which bills of information were
filed with the grand jury charging the reporters of the televi-
sion show with bribery of the star witness in the probe. The
reporters sought an injunction against the foreman of the
grand jury and Garrison under section 1983, but the district
court denied relief under section 2283 and granted summary
judgment for the defendants."
l8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit relied on an earlier decision
and concluded that Section 2283 was no more than a statutory
113. See Machesky v. Bizzel, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Barnes v. City
of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 599-600 (4th Cir. 1964) (dissent of Judge Sobeloff).
114. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
115. Id.
116. 56 MASS. L.Q. note 97, supra, at 27.
117. 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970). See
also 45 NomE DAmE LAWYER 360 (1970).
118. Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673 (D.C. La. 1967).
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enactment of the principle of comity which gave way in those
extraordinary circumstances where the federal injunction is
necessary to vindicate clear first amendment rights. The court,
thereafter, carefully limiting its holding to the context of the
first amendment, noted that the proceedings in question had
"begun" only in a technical sense with the filing of a bill of in-
formation and indictment, and recognized that no equally ef-
fective protection could be had for first amendment rights
other than resorting to a federal injunction. On this basis, it
was concluded that the plaintiffs would be entitled to relief if
they could establish the bad faith and chilling effects which
they had alleged in their complaint and offered to prove.
Commenting on the impact of such a holding, Judge
Thornberry said:
Indeed, we are concerned, as was the district court, lest "every state
defendant might have a go at the game" and win delays and exposition
of the state's case merely by alleging that the prosecution against him
is being brought in bad faith and that his first amendment rights are
being chilled .... In the case before us, however, we do not find that a
reluctance to "open the floodgates" of litigation would justify judgment
without a hearing of appellants' case. In the first place, as we have al-
ready held, the appellants' pleading if fully proved, would state a cause
of action under Dombrowski. In the second place, the cases themselves
demonstrate that the courts have been able to distinguish, with sur-
prising clarity for so difficult an area of law, those cases in which the
Dombrowski requirements are pleaded in insufficient terms or are not
supported by the facts. 119
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it should be remembered that section 1983
is intended to provide "supplemental' relief for deprivations
of federally protected rights. 120 Where such potentially sweep-
ing power is vested in the federal government, however, it is
only reasonable to find that certain checks are placed on this
power in order to protect the delicate balance involved in fed-
eral-state relations. Therefore, while various difficulties arise
in pursuing section 1983 actions which easily could frustrate
legitimate efforts to protect an individual's rights, such incon-
venience should be looked on as the price that must be paid to
preserve a federal system of government. The doctrines which
119. 415 F.2d at 710 (5th Cir. 1969).
120. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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affect section 1983 litigants will hopefully, however, remain
flexible enough to permit federal judges to continue to hear
those cases which, from the totality of the circumstances, re-
quire immediate federal intervention to protect an individual's
civil rights even though some friction with state interests will
result.
EDWARD G. MENZIE
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